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Philosophy and the Lyric 
Peter Lamarque 
 
Abstract 
The paper surveys and comments on some of the issues that arise about the lyric 
in philosophical, principally analytical, aesthetics. In brief these are: definition, 
expression, paraphrase, form-content unity, experience, and truth and 
profundity. The paper shows in each case why these issues are important from 
the perspective of analytical philosophy but also why lyric poetry is not always 
an easy subject matter to accommodate to standard analytical presuppositions. It 
might be thought that theories of meaning within philosophy of language (be it 
semantics, speech act theory or truth-conditions) should be applicable to a full 
range of linguistic usage. But lyric poetry confounds that expectation and yields 
a context where familiar models of meaning and communication can seem 
inadequate. Yet analytical philosophers should not simply dismiss poetry as 
somehow exceptional or aberrant but would gain from looking afresh at basic 
assumptions to see how their views about language might be broadened and 
modified.  
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This is a brief critical survey of some of the issues that arise about the lyric 
within analytical philosophy or specifically within analytical aesthetics. In fact 
the more immediate context for thinking about the lyric within analytical 
DHVWKHWLFVLVWKHUHODWLYHO\QHZILHOG³SKLORVRSK\RISRHWU\´*LEVRQ 
 
It is helpful to think of aesthetics, broadly conceived, as essentially a value 
enquiry: one that seeks to characterise and find value in peculiar kinds of 
sensuous or imaginative experience. Philosophy of poetry, as a branch of 
aesthetics, is also about value and also, I suggest, about kinds of experience. It 
is an enquiry emerging from philosophy of literature, which is in turn a specific 
application of philosophy of art, itself a branch of aesthetics (Lamarque 2009c).  
 
1. Definition 
 
Analytical aesthetics has often been obsessed with definition ³QHFHVVDU\DQG
VXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQV´ yet not many sustained attempts have been made by 
analytic philosophers to define poetry (far less the lyric), and there is no broad 
consensus (Ribeiro 2007). Perhaps the demand for definition is less pressing in 
this case given that poems on the whole are easy enough to recognize. However, 
attempts even by literary critics are rarely without controversy. Terry Eagleton 
offers a rough and ready definition which he suggests might ³WXUQRXWWREHWKH
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best we can do´³$SRHPLVDILFWLRQDOYHUEDOO\LQYHQWLYHPRUDOVWDWHPHQWLQ
which it is the author, rather than the printer or word processor, who decides 
ZKHUHWKHOLQHVVKRXOGHQG´Eagleton 2007, 25). Yet this is problematic on 
many counts, not least EHFDXVHUHIHUHQFHWRWKH³ILFWLRQDO´PDNHVLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ
WRWKHO\ULFWHQGHQWLRXV-RQDWKDQ&XOOHUIRUH[DPSOHKDVDUJXHGWKDW³[t]he 
positing of a fictional speaker-FKDUDFWHULVDQLQDSSURSULDWHJHQHUDOVWUDWHJ\«
>WKDWZHPXVW@UHMHFW«DVDJHQHUDOPRGHOIRUWKHO\ULF´&XOOHU
Yet significantly even those critics, like Culler, who seek to theorize about the 
lyric seem more concerned with characterising core aspects than with pinning 
down a strict definition. In this spirit Culler himself, almost incidentally, 
GHVFULEHVWKHO\ULFDV³VKRUWQRQQDUUDWLYHKLJKO\UK\WKPLFDOSURGXFWLRQVRIWHQ
stanzaic, whose aural dimensLRQLVFUXFLDO´&XOOHU 
 
Arguably a more helpful approach, rather than focusing on definition, might be 
to attend to the practice or practices of those who deal with poetry (and the 
lyric). No doubt there is some culture-relativity here but at a generic level the 
practice-based approach involves identifying attitudes, expectations, responses, 
or judgments that are conventionally or characteristically brought to bear on 
poetry by (knowledgeable) practitioners: poets, readers, commentators, those 
who appreciate or find value or pleasure in poetry. This is not a sociological but 
an analytical enquiry. It might even be conceived in Kantian transcendental 
terms, asking what reading and appreciative protocols must be in place if 
poetry is possible.  
 
Without an established practice with its own concepts and conventions there 
would be no distinction between poetry and non-poetry and no way to identify 
the values of poetry. Some simple facts about the practice are easy to discern. 
Whatever a poem might look (or sound) like, if we take it as a poem we bring to 
it a distinctive kind of attention as broadly determined by the poetic tradition. 
We assume, for example, that the surface language itself is salient, that its 
physical textures, sound, rhythm, metre, repetitions, rhymes, are not merely 
incidental but integral to our attention, to be appreciated in their own right, not 
just as vehicles for but as identifying conditions of the content conveyed. We 
attend to the thoughts embodied in a poem through this precise mode of 
articulation. If we know this is WKH³JDPH´WKDWLVSOD\HG then our responses are 
shaped accordingly.  
 
The idea of grounding the understanding of a concept within a (more or less 
loosely) rule-guided practice, an idea ultimately derived from Wittgenstein, is 
now a familiar move in analytic aesthetics and the philosophy of literature 
(Lamarque/Olsen 1994). So the philosophy of poetry might profitably be seen 
as the exploration of a practice, not the search for a definition.  
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2. Expression 
 
The lyric has a long and culturally diverse history so generalisations must be 
treated with caution. A significant, but not all-encompassing, part of that history 
is the Western romantic tradition which associates the lyric (as emphasised by 
Hegel) with subjectivity, expressiveness and a personal response to a situation 
or emotion. Conventionally, although not necessarily, lyrics in this tradition use 
WKHILUVWSHUVRQ³,´,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWVRPHSUH-romantic lyrics²most 
obviously those in the sonnet tradition, Petrarch, Thomas Wyatt, Shakespeare, 
Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser²also utilised many of these characteristic 
features. It is the practice associated with this broader conception of the lyric 
that has attracted the attention of analytic philosophers given their own 
longstanding interest in many of these aspects, in expression, emotion, 
UHIHUHQFHWKHVHOI³,´3UREOHPVIDPLOLDUWROLWHUDU\FULWLFVEHFRPHUHIRFXVHG
for philosophers.  
 
Take this simple lyric by Emily Dickinson:  
 
My river runs to thee:  
Blue sea, wilt welcome me?  
 
My river waits reply.  
Oh sea, look graciously!  
 
I'll fetch thee brooks  
From spotted nooks,² 
 
Say, sea,  
Take me! 
(From Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily 
Dickinson, Boston, 1924) 
 
The poem has an emotional intenVLW\SOHDGLQJ\HDUQLQJ³7DNHPH´%XWZKR
LVWKHVSHDNHUWKH³,´DQGWKHDGGUHVVHH³WKHH´³%OXHVHD´":KDWLVWKH
metaphor of the river running into the sea? Is it about death, the soul flowing 
into the vast sea of heaven? Is it about love? Is the speaker offering herself to a 
lover? We need not linger on interpretation. But the philosopher will ask: what 
NLQGVRIVSHHFKDFWVDUHWKHVH",V³ZLOWZHOFRPHPH"´DJHQXLQHTXHVWLRQLV
³7DNHPH´DJHQXLQHFRPPDQG" 
 
J. L. Austin famously stated:  
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we could be issuing any of these utterances, as we can issue an utterance 
of any kind whatsoever, in the course, for example, of acting a play >«@ 
or writing a poem ± in which case of course it would not be seriously 
meant and we shall not be able to say that we seriously performed the act 
concerned. (Austin 1979, 241) 
 
He also said, even more notoriously: ³ODQJXDJHLQVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVLVLQ
special ways²intelligibly²used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its 
normal use²ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations RIODQJXDJH´ 
(Austin 1962, 22; italics in original). The implication is that the speech acts in 
'LFNLQVRQ¶VO\ULFDUHQRWUHDOTXHVWLRQVRUFRPPDQGVWKH\DUHQRW³VHULRXVO\
PHDQW´ 
 
Monroe C. Beardsley, WKH1HZ&ULWLFV¶SULQFLSDOphilosophical spokesman, 
FRQVROLGDWHG$XVWLQ¶VYLHZDOEHLWLQDOHVVFRQWHQWLRXVIRUPXODWLRQ³the 
writing of a poem, as such, is not an illocutionary act; it is the creation of a 
fictional character performing a fictional illocutionary act´ (Beardsley 1970, 
59). 
 
But Austin has been frequently attacked on this point, not only in famous 
debates with critics like Jacques Derrida, Christopher Ricks and Geoffrey Hill 
but more recently by philosophers, most notably Maximilian de Gaynesford in a 
series of articles (de Gaynesford 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). De Gaynesford 
argues that in suitable circumstances genuine performatives can occur in poetry 
and that it is important that this be recognised (de Gaynesford 2009a, 13). 
Jonathan Culler concurs, stating it woulG³EHZURQJWRHPEUDFHIRUO\ULFD
QRWLRQRISHUIRUPDWLYLW\FRUUHODWHGZLWKILFWLRQDOLW\´&XOOHU 
 
Who is right here? What kinds of utterances are lyric poems? Underlying all 
this is a genuine fault-line between what might be called Romantic and 
Modernist conceptions. The legacy of Modernism is to stress WKH³DXWRQRP\´RI
the work and to insist that if an emotion is expressed in a poem then necessarily 
attribution of the emotion is to a poetic speaker or persona, not directly to the 
poet or to any psychological state of the poet; it is the language of the poem that 
is expressive and the linguistic mode is fictional. In contrast, the legacy of the 
Romantic tradition holds that poems, in particular lyric poems, reflect 
something deeply personal about the author and even if the scenario depicted in 
DO\ULFLVILFWLRQDOZKLFKLWLVVRPHWLPHVEXWQRWDOZD\VWKHSRHW¶VRZQ
sensibility is always on show.  
 
Lyric poets do indeed sometimes (often?) invent scenes that are both expressive 
and fictional. Emily %URQWs¶VSRHP ³5HPHPEUDQFH´ is one such in which the 
³,´UHIHUVWRDSHUVRQDQRWGLUHFWO\WRBrontë herself (the example is famously 
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discussed in Leavis 1952-3). It is a dramatic monologue. Brontë envisages a 
lover UHWXUQLQJWRDORYHGRQH¶VWRPEyear after year yet slowly coming to move 
RQWRUHOLQTXLVKWKHLQWHQVHHPRWLRQLWVWLUV³Sweet Love of youth, forgive, if I 
forget thee, / While the world's tide is bearing me along´7KHSRHPbegins like 
this: 
 
Cold in the earth²and the deep snow piled above thee. 
Far, far removed, cold in the dreary grave! 
Have I forgot, my only Love, to love thee, 
6HYHU¶GDWODVWE\7LPH¶VDOO-severing wave? 
(From Emily Brontëµ5HPHPEUDQFH¶Norton Anthology of Poetry, New 
York, 2005) 
 
For those who stress the inherent fictionality of the lyric such dramatic 
monologues are paradigmatic, in effect expressive but not personal (or 
autobiographical). For those who deny that the lyric is necessarily fictional, 
these examples are neither paradigmatic nor in themselves impersonal. On the 
latter view, Emily Brontë the poet²like Emily Dickinson in the earlier 
example²is deeply implicated in the nature and resonance of the expressed 
emotion. It is her emotion even if not grounded in autobiographical fact.  
 
The philosopher Jenefer Robinson has sought a middle way between the two 
VWDQGSRLQWVLQZKDWVKHFDOOVD³QHZURPDQWLFWKHRU\RIH[SUHVVLRQ´5RELQVRQ
FK+HUHPSKDVLVLVRQWKHSRHW¶Varticulation of an emotion which, 
following R. G. Collingwood, she thinks not only characterises and clarifies but 
alsoLQDVHQVHEULQJVLQWRH[LVWHQFHWKHHPRWLRQLWVHOI'LVFXVVLQJ6KHOOH\¶V
O\ULF³7RD6N\ODUN´VKHZULWHV 
 
KHFRQYH\VKLVEUHDWKOHVVDZHDWWKHELUG¶VJORULRXVVRQJDVZHOODVKLV
downcast feelings on thinking about tKHZRUOGLQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKHELUG¶V
song. Shelley has given us his reflections upon his emotional experience 
as well as a sense of what the experience is like. (Robinson 2005, 279, 
italics in original) 
 
(DUOLHUVKHVWDWHG³:HJHWDVHQVHERWKRIWKHSRHW¶VZLVKHVDQGYDOXHVDQGRI
how those wishes and values affect his cognitive appraisals about the skylark 
DQGWKHKXPDQZRUOG´5RELQVRQ7KLVPDUNVDVXEWOHDQGVXUHO\
important, refocusing on the poet in a full appreciation of the lyric, a challenge 
to the more extreme demands RI³DXWRQRP\´It also reinforces the timely 
UHPLQGHUIURP&XOOHUWKDW³PDQ\SRHPVDUHmessages that speak of the world 
DQGDVNXVWRFRQVLGHULWLQDSDUWLFXODUOLJKW´&XOOHU 
 
3. Paraphrase 
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T.S. Eliot describeGDVD³FRPPRQSODFH´WKHLGHDWKDW³WKHPHDQLQJRIDSRHP
PD\ZKROO\HVFDSHSDUDSKUDVH´(OLRW-11, quoted in Leighton 2009, 
1677KH³UHVLVWDQFH´RISRHWU\WRSDUDSKUDVHRUDWOHDVWWKH³SUREOHP´RI
paraphrase, arises from the simple thought that to try to capture in different 
words what the poem is saying would be to abandon precisely what gives the 
poem its interest and its very identity. The point follows from the basic reading 
protocol, mentioned earlier, whereby the language of a poem invites attention to 
itself.  
 
Analytic philosophers have a central interest in meaning so the thought that 
there is a linguistic usage such that the meaning of a sentence can be expressed 
in only one way is both intriguing and puzzling. It is a fundamental principle in 
the philosophy of language, when language is considered as a vehicle for 
thought, that there must be different ways, in principle, in which the very same 
thought might be expressed (Lepore 2009).  
 
But the debate about paraphrase and poetry is rife with confusion. What is the 
status of the claim that poetry ³PD\ZKROO\HVFDSHSDUDSKUDVH´? Is it an 
empirical claim to the effect that however hard readers try they are just not able 
to come up with adequate paraphrases? Is it a matter of degree, with some 
poems easier than others to paraphrase? Or is it some kind of necessary truth, 
such that it is impossible in principle to come up with a precise paraphrase? Or 
is it more like a prescription? ± avoid trying to paraphrase poetry. On reflection 
it seems that none of these is quite right.  
 
There has been some interest from philosophers in recent years. Peter Kivy 
(Kivy 1997, Kivy 2011) has argued that paraphrase is not a special problem for 
SRHWU\RQFHLWLVUHFRJQLVHGZKDWFULWHULDRI³VDPHQHVVRIPHDQLQJ´DUH
appropriate. If it is demanded of paraphrase that it LQYROYHWKH³UHSURGXFWLRQRI
WKHSRHP¶VWRWDOHIIHFWRQWKHUHDGHU´WKHQRIFRXUVHLWLVLmpossible. But such a 
criterion LV³QRQVHQVLFDO´EHFDXVH³LWGHPDQGVRISDUDSKUDVHVRPHWKLQJWKDW
never was the object of the exercise in the first pODFH´.LY\ 105). But 
arguably, although Kivy appeals to a commonsense conception of paraphrase, 
he has not got to the heart of what is problematic about paraphrase and poetry. 
After all, when Cleanth BrookVFRLQHGWKHSKUDVH³KHUHV\RISDUDSKUDVH´ 
(Brooks 1968) he was not saying what can or cannot be done but what should or 
should not be done.  
 
In contrast, the philosopher of language, Ernie Lepore, has defended the 
unparaphrasability of poetry by appeal to what he calls hyperintensionality, the 
SUHVHQFHRI³OLQJXLVWLFHQYLURQPHQWVLQZKLFKUHSODFLQJDQH[SUHVVLRQZLWKLWV
V\QRQ\PFKDQJHVPHDQLQJ´/HSRUH 2009, 195). Quotation is an example. 
7 
 
Although bachelor is synonymous with unmarried man, substitution will not 
preserve meaning (or truth) in the move from:  
 
µEDFKHORU¶LVWKHILUVWZRUGLQµEDFKHORUVDUHXQPDUULHGPHQ¶ to 
µXQPDUULHGPDQ¶LVWKHILUVWZRUGLQµEDFKHORUVDUHXQPDUULHGPHQ¶ 
 
Lepore claims that poems too create hyperintensional contexts: ³SRetry, like 
TXRWDWLRQGRHVQ¶WVXSSRUWVXEVWLWXWLRQRIV\QRQ\PVEHFDXVHLWKDUERUVGHYLFHV
for being literally (partly) about their RZQDUWLFXODWLRQV´ (Lepore 2009, 195): 
and if DSRHPLV³SDUWO\FRQVWLWXWHGE\LWVRZQDUWLFXODWLRQLWLVQRWUH-
articulable iQDQRWKHUPHGLXP´/HSRUH193). 
 
/HSRUH¶VVXJJHVWLRQUHLQIRUFHVWKHWKRXJKWWKDWWKHUHLVPRUHWRWKH
unparaphrasability of poetry than just the contingency of what can or cannot be 
done in practice. However, it is questionable whether poems really are (even 
partly) about their own articulation: the idea seems too solipsistic, too inward 
facing. And although hyperintensionality might give an insight into the 
semantics of poetry, it offers little more to an explanation of the value of poetry, 
in particular the lyric, than already noted in the fact that in reading poetry 
special attention is invited to the precise language used.  
 
So perhaps a better way of thinking of unparaphrasability is less as a brute fact 
about poetic usage, more as a convention in the practice of poetry itself: not 
something discovered by readers in reading poetry but something demanded 
within the practice (Lamarque 2009; criticised in Kivy 2011, who believes the 
conception is too essentialist, but powerfully defended in McGregor 2014 and 
Hulatt 2016). 
 
4. Form-content unity 
 
Why should it be that a paraphrase of a poem, however accurate, always seems 
inadequate, never equivalent to, or substitutable for, the poem? Part of the 
answer relates to another familiar commonplace about the lyric, that form and 
content are inextricably bound together (a view associated with A.C. Bradley¶V
OHFWXUHµ3RHWU\IRU3RHWU\¶V6DNH¶Bradley 1926). 
 
Again, though, philosophically speaking, this idea is puzzling. After all, it 
seems easy enough to speak of form and content separately: to identify a rhyme 
scheme, metrical pattern, stanza length, or poem-type without mentioning what 
a lyric is about, and to describe content²skylarks, melancholy, yearning²
without mentioning formal qualities. How could form and content be 
indivisible? The clue lies in the very idea of content in a poem. The crucial 
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WKRXJKW,VXJJHVWLVWKDWVSHFLILFDWLRQVRIFRQWHQWFRPHLQGHJUHHVRI³ILQH-
JUDLQHGQHVV´ (Lamarque 2015).  
 
We can specify content in a coarse-grained manner by identifying a subject 
matter (say, a visit to Tintern Abbey) or broad themes (say, melancholy). At this 
level poems can share the same content (just as could a poem and a paraphrase). 
But the more fine-grained the specification the less possible it becomes for that 
content to be shared: this response to Tintern Abbey, this account of 
melancholy. The question then arises: Is it useful to identify a level of fine-
grainedness such that only the poem itself counts as specifying its own content? 
If the answer is Yes then both form-content unity and unparaphrasability are 
established but again, arguably, it is not a fact about a poem that it exhibits 
form-content unity but a demand made of it when it is read or valued a certain 
way. And the value often cited is the unique experience that a poem affords. 
 
5. Experience 
 
7KHLGHDWKDWWKHYDOXHRIDO\ULFSRHPUHVLGHVDWOHDVWSDUWO\LQDUHDGHU¶V
experience of it is again puzzling for the analytic philosopher for whom the 
primary function of language is to embody and convey information or, more 
ZLGHO\LQ$XVWLQ¶VWHUPVWRSHUIRUPRWKHULOORFXWLRQDU\DFWV$QGDQ\ZD\WKH
LGHDRI³H[SHULHQFH´LVWURXEOLQJO\YDJXH&DQDQ\WKLQJVXEVWDQWLDOEHVDLG" 
 
No doubt the experience sought in the lyric is multi-faceted: affective, 
cognitive, imaginative, and also visceral, in response to the physical textures of 
language spoken. The lushness of these lines from Gerard Manley Hopkins is 
felt: 
  
Let me be to Thee as the circling bird,  
Or bat with tender and air-crisping wings 
That shapes in half-light his departing rings,  
From both of whom a changeless note is heard. 
(FURP*HUDUG0DQOH\+RSNLQVµLet me be to Thee as the circling bird¶
in Gerard Manley Hopkins, The Major Works, Oxford, 1986) 
 
But the relevant experience is not just phenomenological. It emerges from that 
special kind of attention that the lyric invites: in brief, an attention to a form-
content unity. A subject is perceived and imagined through the forms of its 
presentation. What is experienced is the subject through a fine-grained 
perspective. The relevant experience is unique to each work. Of course there is 
a high degree of subjectivity in the experience of individual readers (and 
readings by the same reader at different times) but there is also an important 
level of shared response (Attridge 2015, 167-8). It is instructive to think of a 
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certain species of poetic interpretation less as a search for meaning more as a 
way of encouraging a sharing from one reader to another of the experience a 
lyric can offer (Lamarque 2009a, 417-9). The emphasis on experience is 
important for highlighting aesthetic as well as semantic aspects of language and 
it connects the lyric naturally to other arts, in particular music, painting, and 
dance, where experience is paramount. 
 
6. Truth and profundity 
 
³3KLORVRSK\of SRHWU\´LVQRWWKHVDPHDV³SKLORVRSK\in SRHWU\´3RHWU\RU
verse) can of course be used as a vehicle for philosophy: /XFUHWLXV¶VDe Rerum 
Natura DQG3RSH¶VEssay on Man are obvious examples. But the lyric is less 
clearly associated with philosophy even though, in a looser sense, lyric poets 
will often reflect on abstract ideas (Lamarque 2009b). The emphasis on 
experience, subjectivity, expression, and content-under-a-perspective suggests 
in the lyric a different kind RI³WUXWK´IURPWKDWVRXJKWE\V\VWHPDWLFSKLORVRSK\
RUHYHQWKH³WUXWK´FODLPHGIRUQDUUDWLYHILFWLRQZKHUHWKHDFWLRQVRIFKDUDFWHUV
invite moral, political or even metaphysical appraisal. The lyric poet might 
UHIOHFWRQJURZLQJROGOLNH:%<HDWV³An aged man is but a paltry thing, /  
A tattered coat uSRQDVWLFN´µ6DLOLQJWR%\]DQWLXP¶, Collected Poems of W.B. 
Yeats, Ware, 2000RU3KLOLS/DUNLQ³Life is first boredom, then fear. / Whether 
RUQRWZHXVHLWLWJRHV´µ'RFNHU\DQG6RQ¶, Philip Larkin, Collected Poems,, 
London, 2003). But the interest of such lines is not primarily in the literal truth 
or otherwise of the extracted propositions but in the way the thoughts are 
integrated into an aesthetic structure inviting the kind of experience we earlier 
characterised. Once again we can appeal to an insight from Culler that there is 
DQLPSRUWDQW³ULWXDOLVWLF´GLPHQVLRQWRO\ULFJLYLQJIRFXVWR³PHPRUDEOHZULWLQJ
WREHUHFHLYHGUHDFWLYDWHGDQGUHSHDWHGE\UHDGHUV´&XOOHU 
 
Can lyric poetry be profound? Indeed it can, but not in the mode of a 
philosophical treatise and not simply in virtue of being difficult to understand. 
We call a lyric profound when a sentiment or idea comes alive for us through a 
sense that just this way of expressing it is right, the form exactly consonant with 
the content. The clarity, integrity and precision of the expression bear an 
authority that has the power to grip our minds and perhaps reshape our thoughts 
in fundamental ways. The themes might be perennial²mortality, love, passing 
time, despair²but the exploration of them through subjects as varied as urns, 
nightingales, a train journey, can offer a perspective that is entirely fresh and 
illuminating, and in that sense profound.  
 
Where a lyric, as we say, strikes a false note it is not so much a failure to 
³FRUUHVSRQG ZLWKUHDOLW\´PRUHDPDWWHURIVHQWLPHQWDOLW\cliché or insincerity. 
The ideas or emotions H[SUHVVHGODFN³DXWKRULW\´EHFDXVHWKH\VHHPSoorly 
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thought out, too glib, derivative or lacking precision. Lyric poetry is profound 
through bringing to mind and crystallising thoughts that are original, powerful 
and affecting.  
 
It is instructive for analytic philosophers to reflect on a conception of truth of 
this kind that seems fundamentally different from the propositional truth defined 
by philosophy. Indeed all the topics briefly sketched here relating to the lyric²
practices, expression, speech acts, paraphrasability, form and content, poetic 
experience, and profundity²suggest ways in which thinking about language 
can be extended and enriched in this unusual context, well beyond the familiar 
paradigm of sentences imparting information and corresponding with facts.  
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